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Abstract  
Social Media has allowed activists to make their causes visible and network locally and transnational-
ly with supporters, but posed equal threats to activists, as authoritarian states employ repressive sur-
veillance measures. This paper explores the struggle between the state and activists for visibility on 
social media platforms, and conceptualises the paradoxes of visibility in daily practices in both sides. 
This is done by researching grassroots human rights groups from the Egyptian revolution, and there-
fore contributing to the narrative that social media has presented as many challenges as opportunities 
to activism, because the same tools that are used to leverage activism are also used strategically by 
the state to suppress activism.  
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As much as information and communication technologies (ICTs) enable activism, which can eventual-
ly result in enhancing democracy (Hier & Greenberg, 2009), by allowing social movements to reach 
out to, and engage with, wider networks for mobilisation and attention (Tufekci, 2013), ICTs also ena-
ble repressive surveillance and monitoring practices for regimes, which pose a threat to activists (Hier 
& Greenberg, 2009; della Porta, 2013; Hosein & Nyst, 2013). Surveillance is defined as “a policing 
tactic which aims to quell or weaken political activity” (Starr et al., 2011, p.73), in order to gather in-
formation about social movements, and inhibit them from accomplishing their plans (Starr et al., 
2011).   
 
In Egypt, protests erupted against longstanding dictatorship since 2011, in what became known as the 
Arab Spring. It is claimed that social media has played an essential role in the Egyptian revolution, 
where the numbers of social media users on different platforms have increased dramatically during 
that period (Harindranath et al., 2015). For example, there were 4.1M users on Facebook in 2010, and 
in 2013 the number has reached 13.5M users (Harindranath et al., 2015). But the role of technology in 
the revolution has not necessarily been positive, since activists have had longstanding evidence that 
shows the government is monitoring people in many ways, which were made possible through the col-
laboration of the police with the telecommunication corporations, and through acquisition of surveil-
lance software (Raoof, 2014). As a result, activists have been arrested in 2008 after their call and SMS 
data has been collected from telecommunication companies (Hosein & Nyst, 2013). When the Egyp-
tian revolution erupted in 2011, authorities also arrested Wael Ghonim; the administrator of the fa-
mous Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said”, which operated anonymously then and campaigned 
against police brutality and was considered one of the major online platforms in organising the pro-
tests (BBC, 2011). Egyptian authorities continued to crackdown on administrators of opposition Face-
book pages (Michael, 2014). Journalists, bloggers and other citizens have also been arrested or re-
ferred to investigation over their views on social media (Amnesty International, 2014; Michael, 2014; 
Sakr, 2016). This state surveillance and monitoring is considered an issue beyond the violation of pri-
vacy of individuals, as it is more of a fundamental result of political power (Stalder, 2002). 
 
Despite all this, social media has often been praised in the literature about the Arab Spring and social 
movements, where it has been considered the main enabler of the revolution, and the media created a 
hype about a “Facebook revolution” (Aouragh & Alexander, 2011), and a “liberation technology” 
(Chenoweth, 2016). However, social media is not a neutral tool (Lim, 2012), and the context is often 
overlooked when technology is championed in the Arab Spring, which is considered “a gold rush for 
the surveillance industry - used to crack down on protesters” (Bahrain Human Rights, 2017, no pagi-
nation). The Egyptian government even intensifies its crackdown further by even blocking some social 
media platforms (Hamama, 2017).  
 
Therefore, the same tools that are used to leverage activism, network and spread online posts and news 
virally can also present considerable challenges to activists; a topic which has been understudied in the 
literature, in comparison to opportunities presented by these tools. Therefore, it is integral to study 
how social media spaces are transformed into an arena of power interplay between activists and the 
state, where activists are leveraging these tools to help their causes, while dictators are using the same 
tools to impose control.  In a sense, technology has been paradoxical, which means that “a certain 
technology applied in a certain way in a certain context may have consequences or implications of one 
kind, and may necessarily and at once be implicated in a contrary set of consequences or implications” 
(Arnold, 2003, p.231-232). The paradox concept is therefore used to analyse tensions and challenges 
(Zheng et al., 2011) in the context of technological tools that present the two conflicting sides, activ-
ists and the state, with different opportunities that have opposite consequences. 
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While abundance of research documents surveillance by authoritarian regimes, little has been done to 
research activists’ daily practices and how they handle being monitored. This paper discusses how 
there is a constant interplay of power on social media between activists and the state. Even though ac-
tivists have no choice but media tools to surpass temporal and spatial boundaries (Thompson, 2005) by 
increasing the information flow from activists to the world, and therefore make regimes’ violations 
visible, these same tools are exactly what threaten the physical and mental wellbeing of activists, be-
cause of the imbalance of power to the favour of the state, that not only has advanced surveillance 
means, but also employs means of media propaganda online. 
 
This paper examines the paradoxical effect of visibility in activism, namely, perceiving visibility as a 
double-edged sword with contradictory effects (Uldam, 2016; 2017).  The perspective of paradoxes 
allows us to reveal the “tensions, oppositions, and contradictions” (Poole & Van De Ven, 1989, p.562) 
in the strategies and consequences of visibility and invisibility employed by both activists and the state 
in the Egyptian revolution and its aftermath, which then contributes to further understanding of the 
activism dynamics in the Arab Spring. This research aims to show that ICTs have helped suppress ac-
tivists, who feel they are becoming more visible to the public, while the more powerful state maneu-
vers this visibility to its favour by using the techniques analysed here, resulting in visibility tension 
between both activists and the state. It also contributes to our understanding of how activism is hin-
dered by the state and how such practices are performed, and how activism and state control are in 
constant interplay in online platforms, such that digital activism does not constantly yield results in 
favour of activist groups. This is particularly important in the context of the Arab Spring, where social 
media is championed to be the enabler of social change, while in fact, social media afforded different 
mechanisms of control for the state, to disempower activists, in the same way activists were empow-
ered by the same tools. 
 
The paper will proceed with a literature review, methodology and background information on the 
groups interviewed in this research, then the analysis presents the paradoxes that exist in visibility be-
tween the state and activists, and finally a discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This section first reviews the concept of visibility and how it is part of Foucault’s broader concept of 
the governmentality of populations, then expands to review surveillant visibility in specific; a key 
concept to this paper. 
2.1 Governmentality and Visibility 
In 1978-79 Foucault outlined the concept of governmentality as part of his interest in power, where it 
is no longer centralised but strategically dispersed in societies. It is an expression of disciplinary pow-
er that goes beyond institutions of prison, hospital and asylum in his previous writings (McKinlay & 
Pezet, 2017). Since governmentality is a broad theory, we will draw upon the concepts that are in the 
scope of this article. 
 
Government here is a power technique that refers to how people’s conduct can be guided in a specific 
way. It assumes that those who are governed will adjust or resist the governing measures (Lazzarato, 
2009; McKinlay & Pezet, 2017). Those who govern attempt to decide the conduct of the governed, 
and those who are governed will develop counter measures to bypass or diminish being governed, or 
to be governed differently, or otherwise become self-governed (Lazzarato, 2009).  
 
Foucault labels the strategies to resist as “counter-conducts” (Lazzarato, 2009, p.114), whilst at the 
same time, governmentality leaves no space for collective action (McKinlay & Pezet, 2017). “Gov-
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ernmentalist strategies develop credible ways to define, monitor and assess a population so that specif-
ic types of individuals can be targeted for intervention” (McKinlay & Pezet, 2017, p.4). Brighenti 
(2010) argues that there is an aspect of visibility in how governmentality is performed, while visibility 
has been limitedly mentioned in the analysis of governmentality, as Foucault himself only addresses 
visibility by expressing that close monitoring of subjects acts as a form of discipline (Tazzioli & Wal-
ters, 2016). Foucault did not consider the counter uses of visibility by subjects, even though he argued 
that exercising power always faces resistance from subjects (Tazzioli & Walters, 2016). 
 
Morevoer, Tazzioli and Walters (2016) argue that visibility in governmentality is not merely about 
putting subjects under surveillance, but rather gaining knowledge about them, so that they can be gov-
erned. They further suggest considering visibility as a critical area of struggle and not just a technique 
of discipline, as Foucault did, because if visibility can be considered as “practices of knowledge” 
(p.448) that expose certain subjects while concealing others, then it can therefore be argued that visi-
bility can also be used by the subjects in a reversible way. Therefore, visibility should not be perceived 
only as a practice of unidirectional surveillance, but as a complex system, where many practices of 
visibility contradict and oppose each other (Tazzioli & Walters, 2016). 
 
 To theorise visibility, Brighenti (2010) broadly describes it in three types: recognition, control and 
spectacle. The visibility of recognition is related to social representation, and how people are recog-
nised in the society. In this model, visibility grants power and emancipation to populations, like minor-
ities for example, so groups of people strive to be noticed and affirmed. 
 
Visibility of control is the opposite premise of the visibility of recognition, as the former is concerned 
with how authorities perform control in secrecy. Foucault (1977) has conceptualised visibility of con-
trol in disciplinary societies through the Panopticon model, where more visibility means less power for 
prison inmates, who do not seek to be visible but are forced to. Inmates’ awareness of being constantly 
visible determines their submission for discipline, which affects their behaviour. In modern days, visi-
bility of control is practiced through surveillance technologies.  
 
The third type is the visibility of the spectacle; where objects and characters are advertised as a means 
of “discipline, control and standardisation of the masses” (Brighenti, 2010, p. 49). This type of visibil-
ity determines what events are made visible, and what not, to give populations certain feelings about 
those events. It is a media type of visibility, where certain people and actions are made visible, receive 
attention, and given certain media narratives (Tazzioli & Walters, 2016).  
 
In order to analyse power and visibility, it is useful to examine the interactions between these types of 
visibility, instead of analysing each individual type (Tazzioli & Walters, 2016), which is what this pa-
per aims to do. This is because if visibility can be considered a complex field with different practices 
around exposing or concealing knowledge, then the three modes of visibility from Brighenti (2010) do 
not necessarily explain all the dynamics, interactions and tensions around visibility, especially with 
regards to activism, where there is constant top-down and bottom-up resistance between authoritarian 
states and activists. 
2.2 Surveillant Visibility 
In the context of social movements, the cyberspace has manifested itself into a powerful surveillance 
arena; it is “the ultimate tool for repression and the nightmare of totalitarian societies in which not on-
ly everything is watched and recorded but any action considered out of the normal is a reason for in-
vestigation” (Jordan, 1999, p.199-200). Surveillance is broadly about obtaining and analysing infor-
mation about targeted subjects (Brighenti, 2010), and Lyon (2002) conceptualises surveillance as a 
way of making subjects’ identities and conduct visible, which turns visibility into a social and political 
concern.  
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Surveillance establishes asymmetries of visibility, meaning that certain actors like the state can em-
ploy surveillance means for citizens without the state being seen, and therefore making subjects feel 
suspected, so they become self-disciplined (Brighenti, 2010). The exercisers of power can therefore 
control subjects using surveillance, instead of direct force (Uldam, 2017). There is also another asym-
metry between those who recognise that the monitoring apparatus exists, and those who do not 
(Brighenti, 2010), because details about what exactly is being watched and why are hidden, which 
spreads uncertainty among subjects (Uldam, 2017). 
 
In the context of activism, when activists are aware or scared of surveillance, social movements may 
be forced to exert effort to defend themselves, and are, therefore, possibly driven away from their 
main objectives (Starr et al., 2011). Activists may also respond to surveillance by employing more 
individual undercover forms of resistance, instead of a more apparent collective action (Starr et al., 
2011). States can also use their financial resources to increase their visibility, and therefore, gain more 
advantages over the civil society that lacks such resources and funds (Fuchs et al., 2012). This way, 
visibility acts as empowering and disempowering citizens at the same time. For example, social media 
empowers actors with the ability to be seen by the public because platforms are easily accessed and 
widely available to use. On the other hand, the asymmetrical way social media visibility operates ena-
bles governments to monitor online activity without users knowing (Uldam, 2017).  
 
However, surveillance is not only about watching, but also tracking people and information related to 
them (Brighenti, 2010). It is no longer centred with the government but distributed in the society. 
Haggerty and Ericson (2000) suggest that Foucault’s conceptualisation does not take into considera-
tion modern surveillance technologies, which force us to revisit the Panopticon analogy. Therefore, 
they suggest the idea of a networked “surveillant assemblage”, which departs from the Panopticon’s 
central top down visibility, towards a more complex pervasive system, where there is an assemblage 
of objects, people, knowledge, institutions and processes functioning together. Haggerty and Ericson 
(2000) further argue that by understanding surveillance in the form of assemblages, we are able to see 
the rise of surveillance as “multiple, unstable and lacks discernible boundaries or responsible govern-
mental departments” (p.609), since this assemblage cannot be tackled by blocking certain technologies 
or by condemning a certain institution; surveillance is more dispersed and multi-directional. Under-
standing surveillance in that manner helps us analyse how actors develop different strategies of visibil-
ity (Brighenti, 2010).  
 
The other reason why the Panopticon model is unsuitable for modern day analysis of power and visi-
bility is that it completely overlooks the role of technology that visibilises those who exercise power to 
the public, as opposed to the Panopticon that visibilises the public to those in power; and therefore, 
political leaders are now exposed to the public (Thompson, 2005). The power of technological devel-
opment also lies in the ability of rendering events or actions visible by recording and transmitting 
them, which makes people able to surpass spatial and temporal settings by being able to witness events 
that take place at different places and times (Thompson, 2005).  
 
Therefore, surveillance operates in a world of information flows (Castells, 1996; Thompson, 2005), 
where there is a struggle for the visibility of content, as different individuals strive to make themselves 
seen, or to expose others (Thompson, 2005). Nevertheless, visibility is not only a way of highlighting 
different social and political aspects of life, as it has become more of an arena in which “social and 
political struggles are articulated and carried out” (Thompson, 2005, p.49). 
 
This research therefore follows the argument by Uldam (2016, 2017), that social media visibility is 
potentially challenging, rather than merely empowering, for activism. She has researched corporate 
monitoring of activists and presented the struggle between corporates and activists for visibility, ana-
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lysing this through two of Brighenti’s concepts of visibility: the visibility of recognition, manifested in 
the empowering potential of social media to activists, versus the visibility of control, manifested in the 
disempowering potential of corporates’ surveillance to activists. Nevertheless, this paper will expand 
on the paradoxes of all three types of visibility defined by Brighenti (2010), conceptualising it as ten-
sions between two opposite parties; paradoxes in an arena of constant interplay of power, and asym-
metrical visibility. 
3. Methodology 
The protests in Egypt witnessed a lot of violence, so protesters were arrested and faced trials, or in-
jured and sometimes killed. This has given rise to different human rights groups from the grassroots to 
campaign for victims and provide them with support, and promote their activism to be acknowledged 
widely in and outside Egypt. These groups used Facebook groups or online mailing lists to organise 
their activities and relied on no funding or any formal structure in terms of leadership and spokesper-
sons. This research focuses on 8 groups working in a wide range of activities. Two groups operated in 
in both Cairo and Alexandria have been counted as four because activism was organised with different 
dynamics in each of them. Table 1 offers an anonymous summary of the groups’ scope of work. All 
groups operated in Egypt starting from 2011, when the revolution started, and afterwards, except 
Group5, which formed in 2008, then revived immensely as violations intensified in 2011. Researching 
these groups gives insights on daily practices of activists rather than the overall social media dynamics 
about the Arab Spring, which has been widely researched. 
 
Members of these groups acknowledge that most, if not all, of these groups’ communication, task del-
egation and scheduling is carried out via social media platforms. The online space has made it possible 
for these groups to be founded, and online communication is the most important method to share latest 
news and updates among members, and those who are offline for any reason (like wanting to take a 
break off social media, or unable to financially buy a smart phone) were not regularly updated with 
their group’s activities and plans.  
 
Group  Cause Date Founded 
1 Crowdsourcing medical supplies to field hospitals in places of protests, as pro-
testers were injured.  
2011 
2 Providing legal assistance for people unjustly trialed and detained, operating in 
Cairo. 
Activity includes: publishing video and text testimonials from detainees’ fami-
lies, connecting them with volunteer lawyers, and conducting media interviews, 
among other campaigning efforts. 
2011 
3 A branch of Group 2, operating in Alexandria.   2011 
4 Rescuing and assisting victims of sexual assaults during protests in Cairo, in 
order to empower women to protest. 
2012 
5 Lawyers based in Cairo, providing legal assistance to protesters if they are ar-
rested   
2008 
6 Same as Group 5, but based in Alexandria.   2013 
Azer et al. /Paradoxes of Visibility in Activism 
 
 
The 12th Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems (MCIS), Corfu, Greece, 2018 7 
 
 
7 Advocating for and providing assistance to political prisoners and their families. 2013 
8 Refugees support group in Alexandria: providing subsistence and legal assis-
tance if they are detained.  
2014 
Table 1: Summary of Groups in this Research 
 
The selection of groups relied on the immense impact created by these groups, as well as the publicity 
they received internationally, yet, the dynamics of these groups were not researched in-depth, and me-
dia or research articles often considered these groups as part of the wider protest activity in Egypt. 
Nevertheless, being informed by observations of the online groups’ public social media channels since 
2011, there were frequent details that sparked interest around how these groups’ members face viola-
tions for their activism through being arrested and facing trials, and also sometimes their reduced ac-
tivities at times of greater crackdown. Therefore, to understand members’ interpretation of events, 
semi-structured interviews have been done with them: 17 interviewees were females, and 13 were 
males, and many volunteered in more than one group. 26 interviews were done face-to-face and 4 
were done via Skype. Appendix A summarizes the Interviewees’ affiliations and interviews’ durations. 
The selection of members to be interviewed was based on having people with a variety of roles, expe-
riences, and activity levels. For example, some interviewees were more active than others, and some 
were prominent activists since before the revolution, while others were less experienced. Their roles in 
their groups varied, sometimes based on their professions, as some were lawyers, media professionals, 
or something else. 
 
Interviews’ length ranged from 43 minutes to 2 hours, and had an average of 1 hour 19 minutes. They 
were conducted in Arabic, or English, if chosen by the interviewees. Files were encrypted and the text 
was transcribed and translated to English. Analysis was done thematically, using abductive coding on 
NVivo 11, to produce a list of hierarchical nodes around surveillance at first. After iterating between 
the literature and the data, the relevant data was recoded and arranged under the visibility concepts. 
The 3 clear-cut types of visibility did not cover the rich material and examples set out by interviewees, 
which led to the emerging results in the following discussion.   
4. Visibility Paradoxes 
The richness of data obtained from the fieldwork in Egypt shows that visibility practices and dynamics 
cannot be simply classified as either recognition, control or spectacle, and that it is essential to prob-
lematise visibility deeper. This paper reinterprets and enriches Brighenti’s visibility types under three 
paradoxes, to capture the rising tension between two parties who resist and fight each other’s 
knowledge, existence and practices, through visibility, in the light of the case of activism in Egypt. 
The first two paradoxes uncover the tensions between the three types, in the way visibility is manifest-
ed in the movements, and in the response to these movements and counter movements. The final para-
dox is an internal tension among activists that arises as a consequence of the visibility of control.  
4.1 Visibility as Empowerment versus Vulnerability   
For activism, writing public posts online or making public appearances is needed to make the public 
recognise campaigns, and call for action for causes. For example, writing live tweets in Egypt is an 
important way of reporting from any protest or event. When prominent activists adopt certain causes, 
these causes are automatically promoted in the eyes of the public, who trust the prominent figures of 
activism. Therefore, being public is important for activists to give credibility to the news they share, 
and gain the public’s trust, as well as transfer online news transnationally to the world.  
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It can therefore be considered that social media has made human rights groups visible to, and empow-
ered, different parties, under Brighenti’s visibility of recognition concept. First, the groups in this re-
search were made visible to people who wanted to help with the groups’ work. These volunteers were 
empowered to participate in a social movement when the founders reached out to the public. For ex-
ample, one of these groups was formed because the founder tweeted asking people if anyone is inter-
ested to help, they can gather in a certain place at a certain time. Second, the groups were made visible 
to victims and their families, who needed support, and were empowered by reaching out to groups, via 
social media or the groups’ hotlines. Third, the groups made a massive impact through social media 
such that they became visible to traditional media, which eventually made the groups visible to a wid-
er audience of the population who are not necessarily using social media. A group’s founder men-
tioned that if it hadn’t been for social media, “we wouldn’t have been able to appear on TV, people 
wouldn’t have hosted us or felt forced to host us so that we could talk about the cause”. Therefore, 
social media enabled groups to enforce a narrative of human rights on traditional media, which result-
ed in making the state’s violations visible to the people, and eventually disempowering it. Fourth, so-
cial media has made the groups visible to transnational activists and organisations. Through translation 
and dissemination of information online in written and video forms, the global community has recog-
nised the violations, and many activists were awarded prestigious human rights awards, and hosted in 
events worldwide, which eventually empowered activists once targeted by the state.  
  
The techniques that the groups used to make themselves visible were many. They published victims’ 
testimonials, empowering them by making their stories reach a wider audience, and maintained offi-
cial accounts on at least Facebook, Twitter, and sometimes YouTube. They used branding and market-
ing techniques for their causes (Poell et al., 2016), and specially designed catchy logos that were used 
as profile and cover photos on social media, as well as printed as stickers that activists, and those who 
sympathise with the cause, used as a symbol of making the cause visible, such that those who do not 
know about it ask and become more aware. Moreover, some activists seek being individually visible 
by asking their groups’ Facebook pages’ administrators to identify them by name on social media, that 
X or Y are the lawyers following up on a specific human rights case, and that they belong to these 
groups. Therefore, activists sometimes like have their work visible, recognised and promoted, and take 
pride in being part of their groups.  
 
However, many other activists choose to hide their identities and activities, in order to protect them-
selves from being vulnerable to the state if all group members are identified. This is because as activ-
ists’ recognition increases, the state’s persecution to them also increases. A group administrator said 
that “there is the worry of being spied on, or the admins being found out and then [arrested], there has 
been a lot of worry about this recently…because the group has been targeted and people even ap-
peared on TV attacking us. So there is that worry that they find out who the admins are, and that we 
end up being more directly in the line of fire… We are thinking that we need to use more secure 
means, that we don’t enter the group’s page directly from any of our private profiles, that we use [a 
tool] that prevents anyone from pinpointing our location. We currently don’t open [the group’s Face-
book page] inbox at all.”  
 
There is a significant risk that activists face, because the state keeps a close eye on what is published 
online, and therefore, has persecuted many activists over what they posted on social media. As a re-
sult, many activists had law suits because of Facebook posts, while others were demanded to remove 
Facebook posts they had written about human rights victims. Another example was when an activist 
posted about a case over Facebook and went into a police station to try to enquire about the detainees, 
he was told by the officer that they saw what the activist had just written on Facebook. One interview-
ee said about her group “I think the main issue [that technology introduced] was being constantly 
aware of security breaches and that the person in charge of the page or responsible for any vital role 
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sacrifices or risks their personal life... At some point those working on vital issues in the group were at 
risk of legal persecution, and they were the ones with admin access to the group.”  
 
Therefore, the same social dynamics that grant visibility to groups and victims, also make activists 
vulnerable, as their freedom of speech and expression, and safety are directly limited by the state. As 
this persecution increases, activists also try to gain more visibility in order to gain solidarity nationally 
and transnationally, which can protect them in case they are arrested or imprisoned. This way, visibil-
ity of activists presents an obstacle to the state once a prominent figure is imprisoned. The state also 
imposes control through direct force, which eventually instills fear in activists. In one incident, securi-
ty forces created control by confiscating an activist’s laptops and arresting him from his home, and 
immediately, a group that was logged on from his computer was hacked, leaving all administrators 
with no control over their group’s public Facebook page. 
 
It is evident that surveillance, through the Panopticon effect over activists, was not the only means to 
hinder activism in Egypt. The Panopticon concept alone was not enough to show authoritarian state 
control over online platforms, because control over activists’ visibility extended to dangerous risks 
like imprisonment. There is a constant power struggle that takes place through social media between 
activists and the state, where the state wants activists to know that all actions are monitored, while ac-
tivists, who have the feeling that the state knows everything, also want to be empowered, so they work 
on gaining more visibility to promote causes and raise solidarity.   
4.2 Visibility as Discourse versus Counter-Discourse 
Authoritarian regimes use social media as a tool to balance the power of dissent and provide a counter 
argument to activists’. For example, the Egyptian regime systematically hijacked the comments on We 
Are All Khaled Said Facebook page, in order to create counterpropaganda to the protests in the early 
days of the Egyptian revolution (Poell et al., 2016).  
 
Moreover, according to Abdelsaboor (2014), statistics have shown that Egypt has one of the highest 
number of fake social media accounts worldwide. These accounts are used for hacking purposes and 
increasing number of fans for certain pages. During the Arab Spring, these accounts have spread and 
have been called the Electronic Committees, and aim to influence or deceive the public’s opinions. 
These committees are formed by recruiting people to form a counter online movement that works in a 
systematic way to affect the public and fool them into believing in a certain discourse, or also to con-
fuse opposition groups. These committees mainly seek mobilising people towards an idea or a person, 
and defaming opposition figures, by spreading false news or rumours about people and organisations. 
Such committees have spread for two reasons; first, the absence of professional media outlets that 
people can believe since the state controls all information and news on traditional media outlets, and 
second because people have found a new free outlet for exchanging unbiased news on social media, 
which did not exist before. The effect of propaganda produced by these electronic committees has 
been considerable, and opposition movements also must confront them if they want to spread their 
ideas as well. Because of their organization and training, these committees have become more of an 
industry that helps the regime and its supporters (Abbas, 2014). 
 
Groups in the scope of this research also experienced the existence of pro-regime electronic commit-
tees who struggle to be visible by posting social media content in a systematic way, showing their 
support for the state. In their interviews, activists were unsure whether these accounts are fake, bots or 
real users. There were images leaked off a closed Facebook group that contains an organised pro-
regime group of people, who were agreeing about the posts they need to publish to support the state 
and argue against activists. There is limited information on whether these groups are doing this as a 
paid work or voluntarily, but indeed the president once mentioned in one of his talks that he can now 
“create a story in Egypt through one or more of these social networks’ battalions” (ON Ent, 2016), in a 
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context where he warned his audience not to rely on information on social media, mentioning that this 
could be dangerous. 
 
On the other hand, groups in the scope of this research have been creative and widely acknowledged 
for their use of social media, allowing for “unanticipated forms of visibility” (Trottier & Lyon, 2012, 
p.93). One of the visibility techniques groups in this research used to counter the regime’s propaganda 
was creating an online protest, where they invited users via a Facebook event to continuously write 
comments, during a certain time the group specified, about violations on all social media pages run by 
the state. This has afforded the group visibility when street protests were not an option at all, and the 
first time this idea was implemented, it went viral and attracted attention from international media for 
the thousands of comments posted by users to flood the official state Facebook pages. It showed how 
visibility can be used to bypass crackdown, and therefore provide a way to present violations as a 
spectacle, to gain recognition for movements.  
 
In addition, instant communication and insignificant distance are afforded by the technological tools 
that activists use, in order to make regimes visible, so regimes can no longer hide from the public and 
their actions can be instantly taped and leaked (Thompson, 2005), like what happened with Khaled 
Saeed, a young man killed by the police and his image stirred the public and later became a symbol for 
the Egyptian revolution. Social media has turned the story of Khaled Saeed into an extremely “visible” 
spectacle, which was marketed to stir grievances and encourage people to take action (Powell et al., 
2016), and the same applies to groups in this research. They used social media to make a spectacle of 
the regime’s violations to transnational audience, by posting and translating victims’ testimonials on 
social media, in an attempt to pressure the regime to stop such violations. 
 
If activism is about framing a discourse and spreading knowledge about regime’s violations, the state 
also tries to invalidate the activists’ account of violations online, so there is a clear struggle between 
activists and the state over whose discourse is spread more on social media. Both sides use the same 
tools to market their discourses. Moreover, as activists use violations as spectacles to call for people to 
take action, the state also uses the visibility of certain spectacles to defame activists through traditional 
or social media. For example, the state has leaked activists’ private footage online, and attacked 
groups on traditional media, which are more widespread than social media, and this propaganda 
caused activists to become at risk: “[the group] has been targeted recently and people even appeared 
on TV attacking us. So there is that worry about, or that they find out who the admins are, and that we 
end up being more directly in the line of fire…people started asking publicly who the admins of the 
group are. That’s the main problem now, the security problem”. 
 
Social media then becomes a space for overwhelming amount of contradictory narratives, and it be-
comes up to the audience to choose which side to believe, but in the end, the process of finding a cred-
ible discourse online by a neutral reader, who is not biased towards either side, becomes increasingly 
difficult. With time, there is an increasing threat that the public starts believing state’s discourse over 
activists’, because the state is able to systematically create a higher visibility for itself through propa-
ganda on various online and traditional media channels. And even though activists try to create their 
own alternative outlet for news or video archiving, these efforts cannot easily survive because activists 
become emotionally exhausted from being targeted, and the volunteering model for groups does not 
provide any funds to sustain the groups’ work. Because of emotional exhaustion and immense crack-
down on activists, many of these groups are not currently operating anymore.  
 
The full power and control over media and financial resources that the state has eventually affords it 
with more visibility over activists. The state is then capable of purchasing its own visibility (Fuchs et 
al., 2012), through mechanisms like the electronic committees. The situation can be viewed as “a 
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dance between those who challenge authority, speak true to power, and hope for a more just world and 
those who wish to extend their privilege and power” (Fernandez, 2008. p.171).  
4.3 Visibility as Resignation versus Resistance 
This paradox is a consequence of Brighenti’s visibility of control, where activists’ behaviour and in-
ternal reactions to the state’s surveillance are divided. There was a divide among activists’ opinions on 
whether they should protect themselves from surveillance or resign to it, since they thought it requires 
a lot of effort. Many of them paid much attention to surveillance in their lives and within their activist 
groups. For example, some were extremely cautious, that they put their mobile phones completely out-
side of the room when they hold an important meeting, but others would simply not care to do the 
same.  
 
Consequently, there was a strong divide in how secret Facebook groups or mailing lists they use to 
communicate within the group itself should be run. Some activists had a more careful approach and 
thought that any new volunteers should not be added to these secret online groups unless other mem-
bers can fully trust them, in case they were informers used by the state to monitor what the group was 
planning. On the other hand, other activists thought they were not doing anything that they needed to 
hide, and that “whoever wants to read or see what we are doing is more than welcome”. They thought 
that paying attention to surveillance can be a “paranoid behaviour” that will distract them from the 
actual cause they were working on, because it meant they cannot expand by adding new members, 
despite being aware that they could be monitored by the state through untrusted personnel or surveil-
lance equipment. But it was also part of some activists’ ideology that they should deal with the state 
“as though you have nothing to hide, you behave as though your public work is in fact public, and you 
only hide something to protect victims”. 
 
While other activists did agree that they have nothing to hide, but still thought that they should resist 
surveillance as much as they can, by not making their communication information available to be read 
by untrusted people. One of the members who supported filtering their group from untrusted people 
said that “maybe part of the bravery is being cautious, so that you are actually capable of achieving 
what you want to achieve. I didn’t feel that that was cowardice, but they did…it’s not brave to be 
thrown into prison when I can avoid it... Maybe it stems from that fact that I am very new to this, and 
they have been activists for much longer”. Therefore, being an activist for many years can be one fac-
tor where a person resigns and becomes used to being visible to the public or the state.  
 
Another factor that pushes activists to resign to being visible is the convenience of using user-friendly 
platforms that everyone uses, like Facebook. Resisting surveillance meant the use of sophisticated 
technical routines like Virtual Private Networks to mask the identity of groups’ Facebook pages’ ad-
ministrators, encrypted instant messaging applications, and using complex passwords for activists’ 
personal accounts and devices. This way, activists attempt to shield some information from the state, 
but still acknowledge that everything they do is exposed to the state, and that any technical attempts 
are only to make it harder for the state to know information. Some of these attempts include using en-
crypted chat applications like Signal, which at a certain point in 2016 was blocked by authorities until 
an update was issued for the application to bypass the blockage (Farid, 2016).   
 
Even though many activists considered some platforms, like Facebook, unsafe in their opinions be-
cause their identity can be exposed through it or their accounts easily hacked, but still had to use it for 
their group’s internal communications, because it was most convenient, user-friendly and had all peo-
ple using it. An incident that forced an activist to take a more resistive approach to surveillance is 
when her Facebook account as a group’s administrator was hacked, and the hacker instantly posted 
pro-regime posts under her name, changed the name of the secret activism Facebook group to an in-
sult, and also leaked private conversations from her inbox. The attacker also launched a Twitter attack 
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to insult the activist and took control over her account, which forced her to take a more cautious ap-
proach towards surveillance by using protective technical measures and staying off social media for a 
few weeks, because every time she tried to reclaim her accounts, the attacker tried to hack them again. 
It was not clear who made the attack, but it created negative propaganda and much fear as a result of 
surveillance and control.   
 
The asymmetrical aspect of visibility is clear in activists not really knowing when or how much they 
are being monitored. One group administrator mentioned, “I don’t continuously preoccupy myself 
with that idea [of being watched all the time because of the group’s activity], but when something 
happens I do think that [the group] is the cause. And I do constantly obsess over whether [the state] 
know who the admins are and they are just letting us, or do they not know the admins yet”. Therefore, 
there is a certain acceptance by some activists that they are visible to the state, as they resign to the 
idea that they are going to work within this closely monitored space, without sophisticated technical or 
personal measures for protection, because the nature of activism meant that activists have to go public 
to present their cause. However, this visibility causes crackdown on activists, which makes them con-
sider actively protecting and resisting the state measures, individually or collectively. But more im-
portantly, the state of uncertainty about surveillance is stressful, as one activist mentioned that “the 
mental stress of having to tolerate such an alert state all the time was quite tiresome on the members.” 
It is probably why activists resign to being watched and start embracing it in their lives; the asym-
metry in visibility is stressful to deal with. 
5. Discussion 
Visibility can be a choice for some actors, like activists, and this choice varies at different times and 
political contexts. People choose to be visible when they perceive this as empowering to them or es-
sential to their cause. This is why social movements inherently have to be visible in order to strengthen 
themselves by enrolling their supporters and marketing their causes. It is a visibility of recognition that 
such groups need to gain power and be noticed (Brighenti, 2010). As a result, the more visible a 
movement is, the more cautious their counter-movements (like state authorities) are, in terms of violat-
ing people’s rights, but also, the more these counter-movements are using power and control to watch 
and monitor their activist opponents. 
 
Once the political context changes, and the counter-movements become more powerful, social move-
ments start perceiving danger as they become more vulnerable, and less empowered. This causes a 
divide among movements, and some actors want to continue being visible, to show that they will not 
be intimidated by their opponents, but some will choose to be invisible, and protect themselves from 
the potentially powerful crackdown. This creates different strategic modes of visibility: some actors 
are visible all the time, while some actors choose to be visible at different stages by masking their 
identities but push their whole movement to be visible instead. This way, social movements strategi-
cally manipulate visibility to their advantage by being selective in their modes of visibility according 
to how they perceive, and decide to deal with, danger.  
 
Nevertheless, the asymmetry in visibility puts actors under uncertainty because they are unable to pre-
dict the level to which they are being monitored; similar to Foucault’s prison inmates, since actors are 
not fully aware or certain of being constantly visible. This asymmetry in visibility between activists 
and the state is deepened due to different reasons. First, the advancement in technology allows expen-
sive complex surveillance systems to be owned by authoritarian regimes, who are financially capable 
of purchasing such systems, and also potentially hiring personnel to run online propaganda, so they 
purchase visibility (Fuchs et al., 2012) and consequently, make themselves more visible to promote 
their own discourse, while performing control by closely monitoring activists’ visibility. Second, not 
all activists are technically knowledgeable about risks and security aspects of platforms, or able to use 
complex protective means to mask their identities online, so they resign to being visible, and 
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acknowledge that the state simply “knows everything”. Third, secure platforms for communication do 
not provide the same capabilities that other more popular social media platforms provide, and most 
users exist on these non-encrypted platforms, which ease communication among activists, but at the 
same time risk the identity of activists, who want to hide themselves, if their accounts are hacked. This 
can force activists to resign to visibility, unless a situation happens that makes them start resisting and 
change their behaviour on online platforms to protect themselves. Fourth, the state, being in control of 
the telecommunication infrastructure, has started blocking Virtual Private Networks (Egyptian 
Streets, 2017), and other encrypted services (Farid, 2016), and therefore forcing all communication to 
be visible and monitored, and leaving the less powerful activists struggling to know how far they are 
being monitored. This is how asymmetry in visibility can cause stress to activists, causing them to be-
come self-disciplined, by hiding their actions, or changing their behaviours, for example using com-
plex technical methods and encrypted platforms for identity protection. This way, they are dealing 
with the visibility of control, practiced through technology (Brighenti, 2010), by changing their modes 
of visibility.  
 
Therefore, the paradoxes of visibility show that it is not a case of one side being either always visible 
or not, movements go through different modes and practices of visibility, and individuals in one 
movement can also make different choices about their visibility. The choice to adopt a certain mode of 
visibility is made according to factors like political context, level of crackdown, activism expertise, 
and how much monitoring is perceived by individuals. Spectacles also go through the same process of 
being strategically employed at certain times to achieve outcomes, as activists employ visibility of 
specific spectacles to the advantage of their causes, while the state also uses activists’ personal specta-
cles to counter the discourse of activism. 
 
Finally, this paper has shown that social media does not necessarily empower activists (Aouragh & 
Alexander, 2011; Uldam, 2017), because the paradoxical effect of technology can result in contradic-
tory implications (Arnold, 2003) for social movements. This also contributes to the criticism of social 
media’s role in the Egyptian Revolution (Wilson & Dunn, 2011), and disciplinary surveillance (Fuchs, 
2014), by unpacking the complexity of visibility as an affordance of social media and other ICTs, and 
how visibility is enacted in complex social and political environments through power struggle, group 
tension, individual choices and coping mechanisms.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper goes beyond the conceptualisation of visibility into three individual types, as set by 
Brighenti (2010) to reinterpret the paradoxes under three types, in order to uncover the power struggle 
of visibility between activists, who promote their causes and interact on social media on one side, 
while the state on the other side, manipulates visibility to suppress digital activism, through monitor-
ing and using the online space to market a counter-discourse. The paper proposes to reinterpret visibil-
ity into three paradoxes: empowerment versus vulnerability, discourse versus counter-discourse, and 
resignation versus resistance. These paradoxes highlight the tension in the activism arena between ac-
tivists and the state, and uncover the way activists deal with and respond to visibility. The limitations 
of this study is that there is obviously no clear data from the state’s side on surveillance, regarding 
what exactly is being performed and how. There are further implications of this research that can be 
considered by the technical activist community, who can work on building new, and supporting the 
existing, non-corporate non-state controlled platforms that bypass blocking in order to securely sup-
port activism.  
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Position Length Date  
A1 In person G6 
G7 
Lawyer and activist 
(G6 coordinator) 
1 hr 21 mins December 2016 
A2 In person G3 
G6 
G7 
Activist 1 hr 8 mins December 2016 
A3 In person G6 
 
Lawyer 57 mins December 2016 
A4 In person G3 
G6 
G7 
Lawyer and activist 
(G6 coordinator) 
1 hr 52 mins December 2016 
A5 In person G3 Activist (G3 coordina-
tor) 
1 hr 50 mins December 2016 
A6 In person G2       
G5 
Activist (G2, G5 coor-
dinator) 
43 mins December 2016 




Lawyer 1 hr 33 mins December 2016 
A8 In person G3 
G5 
G6 
Lawyer and activist 1 hr 27 mins December 2016 
A9 In person G3 Activist 58 mins December 2016 
A10 In person G2 Activist 1 hr 1 min January 2017 
A11 In person G2 Activist 1 hr 7 mins January 2017 




57 mins January 2017 




1 hr 26 mins January 2017 
A14 In person G2 Activist 1 hr 9 mins January 2017 
A15 In person G2 Activist 54 mins January 2017 
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A16 In person G4 Activist 1 hr 9 mins January 2017 





1 hr January 2017 
A18 In person G3 
G8 
Activist 1 hr 41 mins January 2017 




1 hr 14 mins January 2017 
A20 In person G7   G7 coordinator 1 hr 10 minutes January 2017 
A21 In person G7  Activist and Lawyer 1 hr 11 mins January 2017 
A22 In person G6 Activist and Lawyer 1 hr 8 mins January 2017 




2 hr 16 mins January 2017 
A24 In person G2 
G5 
Lawyer 1 hr 7 mins January 2017 




1 hr 10 mins January 2017 





Activist and lawyer 
(G8 coordinator)  
1 hr 38 mins January 2017 
A27 Online vid-
eo call 
G4 G4 coordinator 1 hr 54 mins February 2017 
A28 Online vid-
eo call 
G8 Activist 1 hr 5 mins February 2017 
A29 Online vid-
eo call 
G1 G1 coordinator 1 hr 51 mins February 2017 
A30 Online vid-
eo call 
G1 G1 coordinator 1 hr 36 mins March 2017 
Table 2: Interviewees' affiliations and interviews' durations 
